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Abstract
Traditional security analyses are often geared towards cryptographic primitives or protocols. Al-
though such analyses are necessary, they cannot address a defender’s need for insight into which aspects
of a networked system having a significant impact on its security, and how to tune its configurations
or parameters so as to improve security. This question is known to be notoriously difficult to answer,
and the state-of-the-art is that we know little about it. Towards ultimately addressing this question, this
paper presents a stochastic model for quantifying security of networked systems. The resulting model
captures two aspects of a networked system: (1) the strength of deployed security mechanisms such as
intrusion detection systems, and (2) the underlying vulnerability graph, which reflects how attacks may
proceed. The resulting model brings the following insights: (1) How should a defender “tune” system
configurations (e.g., network topology) so as to improve security? (2) How should a defender “tune”
system parameters (e.g., by upgrading which security mechanisms) so as to improve security? (3) Under
what conditions is the steady-state number of compromised entities of interest below a given threshold
with a high probability? Simulation studies are conducted to confirm the analytic results, and to show
the tightness of the bounds of certain important metric that cannot be resolved analytically.
Keywords: Security modeling, quantitative security analysis, vulnerability graph, networked
systems, security metric
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional security analyses are often geared towards cryptographic primitives (e.g., how one
should pad a message before encrypting it using the RSA function) or protocols (e.g., how
a password-based authentication protocol should operate so that it is immune to the off-line
dictionary attack). Although such analyses are necessary, they do not provide much insight into
answering an equally important, if not more important, question: which aspects of a networked
system having a significant impact on its security, and how to tune system configurations or
parameters so as to improve security. The state-of-the-art is that we know little about the answer
to this question. Nevertheless, resolving this question would represent a significant step towards
fulfilling full-fledged quantitative security analyses of networked systems – a notoriously difficult
problem but of important practical value (cf. [5], [20]).
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A. Our Contributions
Towards ultimately addressing the above question, this paper presents a stochastic model for
analyzing some aspects of networked system security. Our modeling approach can be character-
ized as follows.
• First, a vulnerability graph is used to abstract a networked system, where a vertex my
represent a vulnerability or a system with possibly multiple vulnerabilities, and an arc
or edge captures the relation that the exploitation of one vulnerability could lead to the
exploitation of the other. Such graphs can be obtained, for example, by combining the
output of vulnerability scanners and the systems configurations. (There have been some
works on generating vulnerability-like graphs, such as [9], [21], [27], [12], [3], [8].)
• Then, a stochastic process (specifically, a renewal process) is used to describe attacks over
the vulnerability graph. This allows us to capture quantitative security of a networked system
via “the probability that a randomly picked node is compromised when the system enters
its steady state,” which facilitates analyses that lead to the following useful insights.
* The model shows that degree distribution of the vulnerability graph has an important
impact on security of a networked system. We offer a generic method to judge any two
degree distributions, if comparable, from a security perspective. We also evaluate three
representative types of degree distributions, namely regular graphs, random graphs, and
power-law graphs. For two degree distributions of the same type, we give a method to
determine which distribution will leads to a more secure system. In the more challenging
case where two degree distributions are different (e.g., power-law graph vs. random
graph), we manage to give a method to determine which degree distribution leads
to a more secure system. These results would allow a defender to “tune” software
configurations so as to improve security (e.g., by isolating some machines from others
via firewalls).
* For a given vulnerability graph, our model is able to show how a defender should
“tune” system parameters (e.g., by upgrading certain security mechanisms) so as to
enhance security. This is especially important when there is a constraint on the incurred
financial budget (i.e., the defender needs to decides which security mechanisms should
be upgraded).
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* We give a sufficient condition as well as a necessary condition, under which the number
of compromised vertices are below a given threshold (e.g., one third) with a high
probability. This has an important value because it offers a method to ensure that the
system has no more than the threshold number of compromised vertices. This insight
may be particularly relevant in distributed computing, where it is often assumed that
there is an upper bound on the number of faulty machines [26] (otherwise, many
computing tasks are not possible).
Simulation studies are conducted to confirm the analytic results, and to show the tightness of
the bounds of certain important metric that cannot be resolved analytically.
Remark 1.1: Our model can handle arbitrarily large systems (e.g., consisting of millions of
nodes), due to the abstraction of vulnerability graphs via their degree distributions.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present our model.
In Section III we explore the impact of topologies of vulnerability graphs on system security.
In Section IV we explore the effect of tuning the system parameters other than topology. In
Section V we explore conditions under which the steady-state number of compromised vertices
is below a threshold. In Section VI we report the results of our simulation studies. We discuss
related work in Section VII, and conclude the paper in Section VIII. For the purpose of better
readability, we defer most of the proofs to the Appendix.
II. MODEL
A vulnerability graph is finite graph G = (V,E), where V is the vertex or node set with
|V | > 0, and E is the edge set with E 6= ∅. A vertex or node v ∈ V represents a vulnerability
and an edge (u, v) ∈ E means that the exploitation of vulnerability u can lead to the exploitation
of vulnerability v, and vice versa. (In the case of directed graphs, only one direction is allowed.
Since all the results in this paper are equally applicable to both directed and undirected graphs,
we assume that they are undirected.) For a randomly picked vertex v ∈ V , denote by
Pr[D = i] = pi for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where D is the random variable indicating the number of a randomly picked vertex’s neighbors.
In practice, i = 1, 2, . . . , |V |−1, meaning that the distribution is truncated; this does not impose
any problem for large |V |.
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…
(      secure node;        compromised node)
Fig. 1. State evolution of networked system with respect to time
Figure 1 illustrates an example scenario of system state evolution. Initially, no vertex (or node)
may be compromised. As time goes by, some nodes may get compromised, and the compromise
may be detected and then fixed. This process may repeat for many times. An important issue
here is that we need to capture the impact of the states of a node’s neighbors on its own state
because a node may get compromised through an attack that is launched from one or multiple
neighbors.
In order to capture the strength of security mechanisms deployed by the corresponding ma-
chines, we classify them into two categories: attack-prevention mechanisms such as virus or
firewall filters, and attack-detection-and-recovery mechanisms such as intrusion detection sys-
tems. An attack succeeds if it can penetrate attack-prevention mechanisms. A successful attack
is typically detected after a delay in time, and then dealt with some appropriate countermeasures.
We consider a continuous time model with t ≥ 0. At any point in time, v ∈ V is either secure
or compromised. We make the following assumptions. (1) The time, X1, that a secure vertex,
which has no compromised neighbors, gets compromised follows the exponential distribution
with rate α. (2) The time, X2,i, that a secure vertex gets compromised because of its ith
compromised neighbor, follows the exponential distribution with rate γ. (3) The time, Y1, that
a compromised vertex becomes secure again because the compromise is detected, follows the
exponential distribution with rate β. (4) The time, Y2, that a compromised vertex becomes secure
again because of any other reason, follows the exponential distribution with rate η. In addition, we
assume that all the random variables mentioned above, namely the X1, Y1, Y2, and all the X2,i, are
mutually independent. This independence assumption by no means suggests that the event of one
vertex getting compromised is independent of the event of another vertex getting compromised.
In contrast, our model actually captures the fact that one vertex getting compromised indeed
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increases the likelihood of its neighbors getting compromised (i.e., the events that vertices get
compromised are indeed correlated).
Remark 2.1: Notice that we differentiate the above (1) and (2) because some vertices may get
compromised directly by the attacker, and some vertices may get compromised by some other
compromised vertices (i.e., the attacker’s “stepping stones”). We differentiate (3) and (4) because
some compromised vertices may become secure just because they adopt a software patch, which
becomes available only after the detection of some other vertices having been compromised. If
the above differentiations are not important, then one can simply set, say, Pr[Y2 = ∞] = 1 (or
η = 0).
Notations. Our model utilizes the concept of stochastic order [30] to compare two random
variables. Specifically, for random variables R1 and R2, “R1 st R2” means Pr[R1 > x] ≤
Pr[R2 > x] for any x. Naturally, we can say that R2 is a “stochastically upper bound” of R1.
Below we summarize the main notations used in this paper.
α the rate a secure vertex with no compromised neighbors gets compromised
γ the rate a secure vertex gets compromised because of a compromised neighbor
β the rate a compromised vertex becomes secure because the attack is detected
η the rate a compromised vertex becomes secure because of any other reason
D a random variable indicating the number of a randomly picked vertex’s
neighbors with µ = E[D]
K a random variable indicating the number of a randomly picked vertex’s
compromised neighbors
q the probability a randomly picked vertex is compromised when the system
enters steady state (i.e., q =∑v∈V qv/|V |, where qv is the steady-state
probability that v is compromised.)
p the probability a randomly picked vertex is secure when the system enters
steady state (i.e., p = 1− q)
Ct the total number of compromised vertices at time t where E[Ct→∞] = q · |V |
Remark 2.2: In practice, the parameters may be derived from history data. It is also possible
that such derived parameters may need to be adjusted by human security experts (as an analogy,
we mention that even though we have very advanced medical equipments such as Computed
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Tomography (CT) systems, the role of human doctors can never be overestimated). Yet another
scenario is that the model can be used by security administrators to conduct “what if” analyses
based on assigned parameters (e.g., the sets of parameters they care most).
A. General Result
We model the evolution of a randomly picked vertex through a renewal process. Each cycle of
the renewal process is composed of the time interval X corresponding to the secure state, and the
time interval Y corresponding to the compromised state. The security metric we use is q, namely
“the probability that a randomly picked vertex is compromised when the system enters its steady
state.” Intuitively, the smaller q is, the more secure the system is. As a corollary, the expected
number of compromised vertices when the system enters its steady state is E[Ct→∞] = q · |V |,
where V is the vertex set of the system or graph, and Ct is a random variable indicating the
number of compromised vertices at time t.
Theorem 2.3: Given the parameters and assumptions specified above, in the long run, the
probability q that a randomly picked vertex is compromised satisfies the following equation:
1
q
− 1 = h(α, β, γ, η,D; q), (II.1)
where h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) is a function of variable x such that
h(α, β, γ, η,D; q) = E
[
β + η
α+ γK
]
,
where given D = d, K follows the binomial distribution with parameter (d, q).
Proof: First, denote by X2 = min{X2,1, · · · , X2,K} the time for v to get compromised
because of its compromised neighbors. Then, the time that a vertex is secure in a cycle is
X = min{X1, X2} = min{X1,min{X2,1, · · · , X2,K}} = min{X1, X2,1, · · · , X2,K}.
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Given K = k, X2 follows the exponential distribution with rate kγ. Therefore, X is also
exponentially distributed with rate α + kγ. By duplicate expectation [29], it holds that
E[X ] =
|V |−1∑
d=1
E[X|D = d] · Pr[D = d]
=
|V |−1∑
d=1
E[min{X1, X2,1, · · · , X2,K}|D = d] · Pr[D = d]
=
|V |−1∑
d=1
[
d∑
k=0
E[min{X1, X2,1, · · · , X2,K}|K = k,D = d] · Pr[K = k|D = d]
]
· Pr[D = d]
=
|V |−1∑
d=1
{
d∑
k=0
[
1
α + kγ
·
(
d
k
)
qk(1− q)d−k
]
· Pr[D = d]
}
=
|V |−1∑
d=1
E
[
1
α + γK
∣∣∣∣D = d
]
· Pr[D = d]
= E
[
1
α + γK
]
.
Second, the length of time that a vertex is compromised in a cycle Y = min{Y1, Y2} follows
the exponential distribution with rate β + η, it is clear that
E[Y ] = E[min{Y1, Y2}] =
1
β + η
.
Finally, by Blackwell’s theorem [29], p, the probability that a randomly picked vertex is secure
when the system enters its steady state is
p =
E[min{X1, X2}]
E[min{X1, X2}] + E[min{Y1, Y2}]
=
E
[
1
α+ γK
]
1
β + η
+ E
[
1
α + γK
] ,
and thus
q = 1− p =
1
β + η
1
β + η
+ E
[
1
α + γK
] . (II.2)
Eq. (II.1) follows immediately.
Remark 2.4: It can be seen from the proof of the above theorem that the derivation of Eq.
(II.1) takes advantage of a structure similar to what is known as “series system reliability model”
(cf., e.g., [32]). Moreover, we also used, essentially, security notions such as “mean time to
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secure failure” and “mean time to security repair” proposed in [15], but only as intermediate
indices/variables (because our main index is q). We stress, however, a crucial issue here that we
are able to accommodate graph structure through the degree distribution, or more specifically
the random variable K, which has no counterpart in series system models nor in [15]. Exactly
because of this connection through K, we are able to show the analytical utility of the present
model in the next sections. More specifically, although we are unable to give a closed-form
solution to q, we manage to conduct analyses in the next three sections to identify topologies
(in the sense of degree distributions) and system parameters that lead to more secure systems.
These results are valuable because they provide defenders with methods to enhance the security
of their systems.
III. ANALYSIS I: ON THE IMPACT OF VULNERABILITY GRAPH TOPOLOGY
In this section, we analyze the effect of the topology (i.e., degree distribution D) of vulnera-
bility graphs topology on q. We also discuss its practical significance.
Theorem 3.1: If D stochastically increases, then q grows.
Proof of the above theorem is deferred to the Appendix. This theorem is a general result
regarding the effect of degree distribution on the security of networked systems. Specifically, it
suggests that for any two topologies with D st D′, it holds that q < q′, where q (or q′) is the
probability that a randomly picked vertex is compromised after the system with respect to D
(corres. D′) enters its steady state. Therefore, it gives an architect an insight for improving the
security of an existing system (say, by amending the topology), or a new system by choosing a
more appropriate topology.
In order to utilize Theorem 3.1, the system architect or administrator needs to know, for any
D and D′, whether D st D′ or D′ st D. In practice, given any two concrete graphs, statistical
degree distributions may be obtained so as to facilitate the comparison. In what follows we
consider some general scenarios with respect to three topologies: regular graphs with vertices
of random degree Dg, random graphs with vertices of random degree Dr, and power-law graphs
with vertices of random degree Dℓ,ν. For a regular graph, denote by g the degree of the vertices.
For a random graph, denote by r the edge probability, namely the probability that there is an edge
between any pair of vertices. For a power-law graph, the degree follows Pr[Dℓ,ν = d] ∝ d−ν−1,
where ν ≥ 1 and ℓ ≥ 1 are some positive constants, and ν is called the power-law exponent.
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Equivalently, we let
Pr[Dℓ,ν = d] =
νℓν
dν+1
for d ≥ ℓ.
First we give a result on the stochastic order of two topologies of the same type. Proof of the
following theorem is deferred to the Appendix.
Theorem 3.2: (stochastic order between two topologies of the same type) Suppose the param-
eters are denoted as specified above.
(1) If g < g′, then Dg st Dg′ .
(2) If r < r′, then Dr st Dr′ .
(3) If ν < ν ′, then Dℓ,ν′ st Dℓ,ν.
Then we establish the stochastic order of two topologies of different types. Proof of the
following theorem is deferred to the Appendix.
Theorem 3.3: (stochastic order between two topologies of different types) Suppose the param-
eters are denoted as specified above.
(1) If ℓ ≥ g, then Dg st Dℓ,ν .
(2) If ℓ2
2π(|V | − ℓ− 1)ν2
≤ r ≤ ℓ
|V | − 1
, then Dr st Dℓ,ν .
A. Practical Significance
Theorems 3.1-3.3 bring the following insights. Given a networked system where the properties
of the vertices (via parameters α, β, γ, and η) are fixed. Then, the following holds:
(1) When the system’s topology is a regular graph, where every node has the same degree,
the smaller the vertex degree is, the more secure the system is.
(2) When the system’s topology is an Erdos-Renyi random graph, the smaller the edge
probability is, the more secure the system is.
(3) When the system’s topology is a power-law graph (i.e., the vertex degree follows the
power-law distribution), the larger the power-law exponent is (i.e., the lighter the tail of the
distribution is), the more secure the system is.
(4) When the system topologies are regular graphs with Pr[Dg = g] = 1 and power-law graphs
with Pr[Dℓ,ν = d] = νℓ
ν
dν+1
such that ℓ ≥ g, the system with the regular graph topology is more
secure.
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(5) When the system topologies are random graphs with edge probability r and power-law
graphs with Pr[Dℓ,ν = d] = νℓ
ν
dν+1
such that ℓ
2
2π(|V | − ℓ− 1)ν2
≤ r ≤ ℓ
|V | − 1
, the system with
the random graph topology is more secure.
Remark 3.4: We should mention that Theorem 3.1 does not necessarily imply C(D)t→∞ st
C
(D′)
t→∞, where C
(D)
t→∞ (or C(D
′)
t→∞) is the number of compromised vertices in a system with respect
to D (corres. D′) when the system enters its steady state. This is because C(D)t→∞ and C(D
′)
t→∞
depend on both q and |V |. However, for two graphs of the same |V |, D st D′ does imply
C
(D)
t→∞ st C
(D′)
t→∞, and thus E[C
(D)
t→∞] ≤ E[C
(D′)
t→∞], meaning that, on average, there are less
compromised vertices in the system corresponding to D than in the system corresponding to D′.
Finally, it deserves special mention that, since E[D] ≤ E[D′] is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for D st D′, the condition in Theorem 3.1, namely that D stochastically increases,
can not be substituted by the condition that E[D] increases.
IV. ANALYSIS II: ON TUNING PARAMETERS
In the previous section we explored the effect of topologies. In this section, we investigate
the effect of tuning α, β, γ, and η. We also discuss its practical significance.
Proposition 4.1: Suppose the parameters are specified as given above. Then, q decreases as
β + η grows, and q increases as α or γ grows.
Proof of the above proposition is deferred to the Appendix. The proposition says that security
of a system can be improved by either increasing β + η, or decreasing α or γ. While this can
serve as a general guideline for the defenders, an answer to the following question may be of
even more value: Which parameters play more important roles in making the system more secure
(i.e., decreasing q)? In order to answer this question, we consider three strategies:
* Strategy 1: Increase β to β + ω, which is equivalent to increase β + η to β + η + ω.
* Strategy 2: Decrease α to positive α− ω.
* Strategy 3: Decrease γ to positive γ − ω.
We have the following proposition, whose proof is deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 4.2: Suppose we are given G = (V,E), where E is generated according to D
that follows a given degree distribution. Suppose the other parameters are specified as given
above. Then the following holds:
(1) If α > β + η, then Strategy 1 is better than Strategy 2 for ω ∈ (0, α− β − η].
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(2) If α+ γµ < β + η, then Strategy 2 is better than Strategy 1 for ω ∈ (0, β+ η−α− γµ].
(3) If αµ
α+β+η
≥ 1, then Strategy 3 is better than Strategy 2 for ω ∈ (0,min{α, γ}).
A. Practical significance
The above results are useful. Specifically, Proposition 4.1 serves as a general guideline that
shows that security of a system can be improved by either increasing β + η (e.g., by deploying
some reactive security mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems), or decreasing α or γ
(e.g., by deploying some proactive security mechanisms such as virus filters). Proposition 4.2
gives the conditions under which increasing β to β + ω, decreasing α to α − ω, or decreasing
γ − ω is more effective.
V. ANALYSIS III: BOUNDING q
Since q is determined by Eq. (II.2), which is an implicit equation that we are unable to solve,
we instead manage to bound q in this section. As we will see, it is easy to bound q in the case
of regular graphs (Proposition 5.1). The case for arbitrary graphs is more involved (Proposition
5.2). Proofs of the propositions are deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 5.1: (upper and lower bounding q in regular graphs) Consider a regular graph
G with degree d. We have
α
α+ β + η
≤ q ≤
α+ γd
α + γd+ β + η
. (V.1)
Now we upper bound q for arbitrary degree distribution.
Proposition 5.2: (upper and lower bounding q in arbitrary graphs) Consider a graph G with
an arbitrary degree distribution D with µ = E[D]. We have
α
α+ β + η
≤ q ≤
α+ γµ
α + β + η + γµ
.
Corollary 5.3: Consider a graph G with an arbitrary degree distribution D with µ = E[D].
Then, in the long run,
|V | · α
α + β + η
≤ E[Ct] ≤
|V | · (α + γµ)
α + β + η + γµ
. (V.2)
A. Practical Significance
In this subsection we discuss the practical significance of the bounds on q obtained above.
Specifically we are interested in deriving some sufficient and necessary conditions under which
November 25, 2008 DRAFT
X. LI, P. PARKER, AND S. XU 13
Ct→∞ ≤ c · |V | with a high probability 1− ε, where 0 < c < 1 may be seen as the threshold of
tolerable portion of compromised vertices, and ε is a given parameter. Since we are unable to
derive a closed-form for q, the conditions are also based on the bounds of q.
Let C˜t be the random variable of binomial distribution with parameter (|V |, q˜) and Cˆt be the
random variable of binomial distribution with parameter (|V |, qˆ). Since qˆ ≤ q ≤ q˜, Cˆ(t) st
Ct st C˜t for large t, which implies
Pr[Cˆt ≤ x] ≥ Pr[Ct ≤ x] ≥ Pr[C˜t ≤ x], for all x. (V.3)
First we give a sufficient condition for Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1 − ε in the following proposition,
whose proof is deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 5.4: (sufficient condition) If
α + γµ
α+ β + η + γµ
≤
c2|V |
|V |+ z2(ε)
, (V.4)
then Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1− ε.
Now we give a necessary condition for Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1 − ε in the following propostion,
whose proof is deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 5.5: (necessary condition) If Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1− ε, then
α
α + β + η
≤
c2|V |
|V |+ z2(ε)
. (V.5)
VI. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section we report the results of our simulation study. The focus is to show the following:
* The stability of qi and q. When the system enters its steady state from the perspective of
qi, the probability that node i ∈ V is compromised, becomes almost stable (i.e., with very
small standard deviation). Indeed, once the qi becomes almost stable, the averaged q, the
probability that a randomly picked node is compromised, is also stable. This is shown in
Section VI-B.
* The impact of graph topology on the underlying system’s security. For simplicity, we only
considered different topologies of the same type. This is shown in Section VI-C.
* The impact of different parameter tuning methods. For some arbitrarily selected parameters,
we compare which methods lead to more secure systems. This is shown in Section VI-D.
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* The tightness (or looseness) of the bounds on the number of compromised vertices. This is
shown in Section VI-E.
* The validity of the sufficient condition under which the number of compromised nodes is
below a threshold with a high probability. This is shown in Section VI-F.
A. Simulation Setting and Methodology
Recall that our model was built on top of an undirected graph G = (V,E) with no self-
loops, where G is certain abstractions of networked systems and every v ∈ V is initially secure.
We considered three different types of topologies: regular graph, random graph, and power-law
graph.
In our simulations, we used regular graphs with default node degree value 5, random graphs
with default edge probability p = 0.002. Regarding power-law graphs, we used two generators:
one is the Brite topology generator [18], and the other is the PLOD topology generator [22].
The reason is that while Brite was widely used, it seemingly does not provide us a way to
specify the power-law exponents, which is needed for comparing two power-law graphs. This
functionality is provided by PLOD. All experiments were performed on graphs with 2000
nodes. Typical parameters were α = 0.05, β = 0.2, and γ = 0.1, which were used except
where otherwise specified. All simulation Ct values were averaged over at least 100 runs, unless
otherwise specified. The graphs used in our simulations are summarized in Figure 2.
Recall that our model is a continuous time model. In our simulation, we used an event-driven
simulation. An event occurs when a vertex changes state from secure to compromised, or vice-
versa. When a vertex’s state should change depends on the parameters of α, β, and γ as well
as the states of its neighbors. For example, if one of a secure vertex’s neighbor has just become
compromised, a new exponentially-distributed waiting time is calculated by using an updated rate.
This can simply replace the existing waiting time due to the memoryless property of exponential
distributions. In the simulation, time is discretized using a 64-bit floating-point time granularity,
and pseudorandom numbers are generated using the Mersenne Twister generator [16].
B. Stability of the qi’s
In order to show that qi, and thus q = (
∑
i∈V qi)/|V | and Ct, will be stable, we measured, for
every i ∈ V in every simulation, qi from every consecutive interval of length 20, until time step
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Graph type |V | =? Parameter Average degree µ
Regular* 2000 5 5
Regular 2000 (4,3,2) (4,3,2)
Random 2000 p = 0.001 2.235
Random* 2000 p = 0.002 3.957
Random 2000 p = 0.003 6.017
Power-law* (Brite) 2000 m = 2∗∗ 3.997
Power-law (PLOD) 2000 ν = 1.421∗∗∗ 3.373
Power-law (PLOD) 2000 ν = 1.424∗∗∗ 3.356
Power-law (PLOD) 2000 ν = 1.429∗∗∗ 3.330
Fig. 2. Graphs used in our simulations. An asterisk (*) marks graphs that are the default for that type, which are used except
where otherwise noted. (**) signifies the following: According to the Brite documentation, this controls the average outdegree.
Since we treat the graph as undirected, our average degree is about twice the average outdegree (i.e., average outdegree + average
indegree). (***) signifies that this value was computed based on measurement.
330. Then we averaged them over 100 simulation runs. For each vertex, we truncated the first
30 timesteps, then we obtain 15 “samples” of its qi, which allows us to calculate its standard
deviation. Based on each vertex’s deviation, Figure 3 shows that most vertices have standard
deviations less than 3%. Notice that topology has a slight impact on stability. More specifically,
for the simulation parameters, regular graphs have a smaller deviation when compared with
random graphs, which have a smaller deviation when compared with power-law graphs.
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Fig. 3. Histogram of standard deviation of qi’s
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C. Impact of Graph Topology on Security
In Section III we showed that the topology of the graph abstracted from a networked system
has an impact on security of the system. Figure 4 confirms this. More specifically, Figure 4.(a)
shows that regular graphs with lower degree are more secure; Figure 4.(b) shows that random
graphs with lower edge probability are more secure; Figure 4.(c) shows that power-law graphs
with smaller exponents are more secure.
The most difficult to verify was that power-law graphs with smaller exponents are more secure,
as we needed power-law graphs of varying exponent but identical degree. We used the PLOD
generator to generate graphs of different exponents. Unfortunately, average degrees of graphs
PLOD generated varied considerably, so we generated almost 3000 graphs to try to find three of
similar degree and varied exponent. We found three with µ ∈ [3.34, 3.37], and ν ∈ [1.421, 1.429].
These are shown in Figure 4.(c), which is averaged over 2000 runs to show the difference clearly.
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Fig. 4. Impact of topology on security
D. Impact of Parameter Tuning
In Section IV we showed tuning parameters in certain way under certain circumstances would
lead to more secure systems. Figure 5 confirms this. Specifically, recall that Strategy 1 is to
increase β to β + ω, Strategy 2 is to decrease α to α − ω, and Strategy 3 is to decrease γ
to γ − ω. Figure 5.(a) considers a fixed G as well as parameters α = 0.1, γ = 0.1, β = 0.05
as the base case, and parameter ω = 0.05. It shows that Strategy 1 leads to a more secure
system than Strategy 2 does. Figures 5.(b) considers fixed G as well as parameters α = 0.05,
γ = 0.05, β = 0.3 for base case, and parameter ω = 0.04. It shows that Strategy 2 leads to a
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more secure system than Strategy 1 does. Figures 5.(c) considers the base case of fixed G as
well as parameters α = 0.1, γ = 0.1, β = 0.2 for base case, and parameter ω = 0.05. It shows
that Strategy 3 leads to a more secure system than Strategy 2,
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Fig. 5. On the impact of strategies on security
E. Accuracy of the Bounds
In Section V we gave upper and lower bounds on q, and thus E[Ct]. We would like to confirm
that these bounds are valid, and also like to observe how tight (or loose) they are. Since the
bounds of E[Ct] = q · |V |, where q depends on parameters, α, β, γ, η, and ν, for clarification
we set η = 0 because it has a similar impact as β does. For each type of graph G = (V,E),
we would like to investigate the impact of varying α, γ, and β from 0.1 to 0.5 with step-length
0.1. In order to plot some 3-dimensional surface graphs for E[Ct], we vary two parameters in
each graph with the third one being constant at 0.1. For these graphs, we let gnuplot interpolate
the simulation surface from 4 squares by 4 squares to 16 by 16 for viewability. This reduces
simulation time from 1600 CPU hours to 100 CPU hours.
The case of regular graphs. Figure 6 compares the simulated Ct and the upper and lower
bounds of E[Ct] for a regular graph G. Specifically, Figure 6.(a) depicts the effect of Ct while
varying α and β, Figure 6.(b) depicts the effect of Ct while varying α and γ, Figure 6.(c) depicts
the effect of Ct while varying γ and β.
From them we draw the following observations:
1) For regular graphs with fixed γ = 0.1, when α is significantly greater than 0.1 and β is
significantly less than 0.5, the upper bound is indeed very tight. It seems that the smaller
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(a) γ = 0.1 when varying α and β from 0.1 to 0.5 (b) β = 0.1 when varying α and γ from 0.1 to 0.5
(c) α = 0.1 when varying γ and β from 0.1 to 0.5
Fig. 6. Accuracy of the upper and lower bounds in the case of regular graphs (|V | = 2, 000): simulation results vs. bounds
β − α the tighter the upper bound (including the case α > β). The cause is perhaps
that before the compromised vertices successfully launch attacks against other vertices,
they have been detected and appropriately dealt with. On the other hand, the lower bound
is constantly loose. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture γ, which reflects the
interactions between the vertices.
2) For regular graphs with fixed β = 0.1, the upper bound is always tight except when both
α and γ approach 0. On the other hand, the lower bound is always loose, and becomes
meaningless when α approaches 0.1. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture γ,
which which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
3) For regular graphs with fixed α, the upper bound is always tight except when γ approaches
0.1 and β approaches 0.5. The cause is unclear. On the other hand, the lower bound is
always loose, but does not oscillate much. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture
November 25, 2008 DRAFT
X. LI, P. PARKER, AND S. XU 19
γ, which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
In summary, the upper bound is quite tight, especially in the case of fixed β, whereas the
lower bound is quite loose in most cases. Moreover, it seems the tightness of the upper bounds
is sensitive to β. This means we can use the upper bounds as a good approximation in further
reasoning (e.g., the sufficient condition under which the compromised number of nodes is below
a threshold with a high probability; see below).
The case of random graphs. Figure 7 compares the simulated Ct and the upper and lower
bounds of E[Ct] for a random graph G. Specifically, Figure 7.(a) depicts the effect of Ct while
varying α and β, Figure 7.(b) depicts the effect of Ct while varying α and γ, Figure 7.(c) depicts
the effect of Ct while varying γ and β.
(a) γ = 0.1 when varying α and β from 0.1 to 0.5 (b) β = 0.1 when varying α and γ from 0.1 to 0.5
(c) α = 0.1 when varying γ and β from 0.1 to 0.5
Fig. 7. Accuracy of the upper and lower bounds in the case of random graphs (|V | = 2, 000): simulation results vs. bounds
From them we draw the following observations:
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1) For random graphs with fixed γ = 0.1, when α is significantly greater than 0.1 and β is
significantly less than 0.5, the upper bound is indeed very tight. It seems that the smaller
β − α the tighter the upper bound (including the case α > β). The cause is perhaps
that before the compromised vertices successfully launch attacks against other vertices,
they have been detected and appropriately dealt with. On the other hand, the lower bound
is constantly loose. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture γ, which reflects the
interactions between the vertices.
2) For random graphs with fixed β = 0.1, the upper bound is always tight except when both
α and γ approach 0. On the other hand, the lower bound is always loose, and becomes
meaningless when α approaches 0.1. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture γ,
which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
3) For random graphs with fixed α, the upper bound is always tight except when γ approaches
0.1 and β approaches 0.5. The cause is unclear. On the other hand, the lower bound is
always loose, but does not oscillate much. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture
γ, which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
In summary, the upper bound is quite tight, especially in the case of fixed β, whereas the
lower bound is quite loose in most cases. Moreover, it seems the tightness of the upper bounds
is sensitive to β. This means we can use the upper bounds as a good approximation in further
reasoning (e.g., the sufficient condition under which the compromised number of nodes is below
a threshold with a high probability; see below). Notice that there is no significant difference
between the above regular graph case and the above random graph one.
The power-law graph case. Figure 8 compares the simulated Ct and the upper and lower bounds
of E[Ct] for a power-law graph G. Specifically, Figure 8.(a) depicts the effect of Ct while varying
α and β, Figure 8.(b) depicts the effect of Ct while varying α and γ, Figure 8.(c) depicts the
effect of Ct while varying γ and β.
From them we draw the following observations:
1) For power-law graphs with fixed γ = 0.1, when α is significantly greater than 0.1 and β is
significantly less than 0.5, the upper bound is indeed very tight. It seems that the smaller
β − α the tighter the upper bound (including the case α > β). The cause is perhaps
that before the compromised vertices successfully launch attacks against other vertices,
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(a) γ = 0.1 when varying α and β from 0.1 to 0.5 (b) β = 0.1 when varying α and γ from 0.1 to 0.5
(c) α = 0.1 when varying γ and β from 0.1 to 0.5
Fig. 8. Accuracy of the upper and lower bounds in the case of power-law graphs (|V | = 2, 000): simulation results vs. bounds
they have been detected and appropriately dealt with. On the other hand, the lower bound
is constantly loose. The reason is perhaps that it does not capture γ, which reflects the
interactions between the vertices.
2) For power-law graphs with fixed β = 0.1, the upper bound is somewhat tight except
when both α and γ approach 0. On the other hand, the lower bound is always loose,
and becomes meaningless when α approaches 0.1. The reason is perhaps that it does not
capture γ, which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
3) For power-law graphs with fixed α, the upper bound is always tight except when γ
approaches 0.1 and β approaches 0.5. The cause is unclear. On the other hand, the lower
bound is always loose, but does not oscillate much. The reason is perhaps that it does not
capture γ, which reflects the interactions between the vertices.
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In summary, the upper bound is somewhat tight, especially in the case of fixed β, whereas the
lower bound is quite loose in most cases. Moreover, it seems the tightness of the upper bound is
sensitive to β. This means we can still use the upper bounds as a good approximation in further
reasoning. Notice that there is a significant difference between the above regular / random graph
cases and the power-law graph one.
Summary. The lower bound given be our model is always loose. The upper bound given by
our model is often quite tight, and the tightness varies insignificantly from regular graphs (with
degree 5), random graphs (with average degree 0.002 × 2000 = 4), to power-law graphs (with
average degree 3.997). This similarity may have been caused by the fact that the average degrees
of the graphs are about the same. In each type of graph, it seems that the tightness of the upper
bounds is sensitive to β.
F. On the Validity of the Sufficient Condition
The above simulation results indicated that the upper bound given by our model is quite tight.
Now we further validate the utility of the upper bounds for the purpose of specifying a sufficient
condition under which the number of compromised vertices is below a threshold (e.g., one third)
with a high probability, namely Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1 − ε. Such a sufficient condition is useful
because it further simplifies the task of system administrators in tuning parameters towards a
given goal.
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Fig. 9. On the validity of the sufficient condition
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For this purpose, we tested a number of cases including many where the premise “marginally”
held; in no case were we able to find more than ε instances where Ct > c ∗ |V | – usually there
were no instances at all. Figure 9.(a) uses a scatter graph of Ct from 10 simulation runs to depict
the most excess simulation values of Ct we found, using parameters α = 0.25, γ = 0.1, and
β = 0.002. Note that instances of Ct above the line c · |V | are much fewer than ε = 0.159 =
15.9%, where c = 0.5, ε = 0.159, and z = 2. For a even better visual effect, Figure 9.(b) plots
Ct vs. c · |V | in a single simulation run (randomly selected).
VII. RELATED WORK
There have been some attempts to understand security of networked systems by considering a
system as a whole. Nevertheless, our approach can address some unique and important questions.
Existing epidemic-like models vs. our model. Epidemic models [17], [14], [6], [4] have
been adopted to investigate the spreading of computer viruses or worms pioneered by [13].
As mentioned before, our model can be seen as a generalization of traditional epidemic models
because traditional models often (the exceptions are discussed below) assume that every node
or vertex has equal contact with everyone else (i.e., effectively regular graphs), and that the rate
of infection is largely determined by the density of the infected individuals. Such homogeneous
models cannot capture the heterogeneity of the vertex degrees in vulnerability graphs. Whereas,
our model can.
The aforementioned exceptions that considered non-homogeneous graphs are due to the fol-
lowing. Epidemic spreading in the Barabasi-Albert power-law networks [7] is investigated in
[19], [24], [25], [23]. More general non-homogeneous graphs are investigated in [34], [33], [11].
The differences between these models and ours are the following.
• All of the models in [34], [33], [11] can only capture the spreading behavior of attacks, and
cannot capture the fact that computers can get compromised because of their own reasons
(e.g., a user downloads and executes a malicious code). In contrast, our model captures this
(through the parameter α > 0).
• None of the models in [34], [33], [11] can answer questions our model deals with, namely
“How a defender should “tune” system configurations or parameters so as to improve
security.” This is true even though [33] indicated that indicates that CAN [28] might be
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more secure than Chord [31] against attacks, because the former is a lower degree regular
graph.
Privilege graph and attack graph based approaches vs. our approach. In a privilege graph
[9], [21], a vertex represents a set of privileges on some objects and an arc represents a
vulnerability. An arc exists from one vertex to another if there is a method allowing a user
owning the former vertex’s privileges to obtain those of the latter. In an attack graph, a vertex
represents the state of a network (i.e., the values assigned to relevant system attributes such as
specific vulnerabilities on various hosts and connectivity between hosts), and an edge represents
a step in an attack (cf. [27], [12], [3] and the references therein). A designated vertex (or set of
vertices) represents the initial state(s), and each transition represents a specific exploit that an
attack can carry out.
The main difference between privilege and attack graphs and ours lies in the model purpose
and scalability. From a purpose perspective, privilege graphs can be used to estimate the effort
an attacker, in order to defeat the system security objectives, might expend to exploit the
vulnerabilities. Attack graphs can be used to identify end-to-end attack paths by chaining together
the vulnerabilities uncovered by the vulnerability scanners. In contrast, our model focuses on
investigating the impact of system attributes, such as topologies and vertex properties, on the
security of the system. Moreover, our approach suggests methods to “tune” the parameters to
lead to more secure systems. From a scalability perspective, privilege and attack graph based
approaches suffer from limited scalability, because of their inherent exponential state explosion
[3], [8]. In contrast, our approach is scalable because there is no issue of state explosion.
Key challenge graph based approach vs. our approach. In a key challenge graph [8], a
vertex represents a host, and an arc represents a key challenge — an abstraction to capture
access control. A key challenge is, for instance, a password authentication prior to accessing to
a resource. The starting point of an attack could be one or more vertices, which are assumed to
be initially in the control of the attacker. The target of an attack could be one or more vertices,
for which the attacker knows the location and the paths to reach them. A successful attack is a
sequence of zero or more vertices not in the initial set but eventually containing all the target
vertices. The cost of an attack is measured as the sum of the effort required to compromise
individual vertices by attempting to counter the key challenges on the edges. Since there are
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multiple paths from the starting point to the target, a problem of particular interest is to find an
attack path of minimum cost.
The main difference between the key challenge graph based approach and ours lies in the model
purpose and capability. From a purpose perspective, the key challenge graph based approach
emphasizes an algorithmic aspect of finding an optimal attack path, namely that the adversary
can achieve its goal with minimal effort or cost. As noted before, our model focuses on the
impact of system attributes on the security of the system, and suggests methods to “tune” the
attributes to lead to more secure systems. From a capability perspective, the key challenge graph
based approach can only capture the attack behaviors with respect to some specific starting points
(i.e., the vertices initially compromised); otherwise, it will encounter the exponential explosion
problem. In contrast, our modeling approach does not need to know the initially compromised
vertices. Instead, it can accommodate the scenario of no initially compromised vertices.
Connectivity-oriented analysis vs. our security-oriented analysis. Connectivity-oriented anal-
ysis of networked systems can be traced back to the early days of random graph theory [10]. A
central problem in this context is to investigate the network reliability subject to edge removals,
namely the probability that graph remains connected after removing some edges. Recently, such
analysis has been extended to explore the impact of topologies of complex communication
networks, including the impact of removing vertices, which is more damaging because removal
of a vertex implies the removal of all its edges as well. It turns out that there is a strong
correlation between connectivity and network topology [1]. For example, consider networks that
have the same number of vertices and edges, and differ only in their degree distributions. Then,
power-law networks are more robust than random networks against random vertex failures, but
are more vulnerable when the most connected vertices are targeted [2].
Connectivity-oriented analysis does not necessarily bring much insight for security analysis.
This is because a malicious attacker would be more likely to use the compromised vertices as
“stepping stones” to attack some more vertices, rather than simply undermining the network
connectivity. Therefore, the connectivity of a system may never be jeopardized, but the security
has been undermined. Our model focuses on the security aspect by taking into consideration the
perspective of topologies as well as vertex properties. Moreover, our model suggests methods
to “tune” the parameters to lead to more secure systems.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a novel modeling approach to investigating security of networked systems based
on their vulnerability graph abstractions. Our model carries insights into designing more secure
new systems or enhancing security of existing systems. In particular, it offers methods for tuning
system configurations and parameters so as to make systems more secure.
While we believe that this paper moves a significant step towards full-fledged quantitative
security analyses, we hope that it will inspire more investigations in tackling this challenging
problem. For example, our trick of accommodating network topology through its degree distri-
bution possibly represents an approach to fulfilling the program “from dependability to security”
envisioned in [20].
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APPENDIX
The following is the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof: Suppose D′ is another random degree such that D st D′. In parallel to K being
the distribution of the number of a vertex’s compromised neighbors with respect to D, we denote
by K ′ the number of a randomly picked vertex’s compromised neighbors with respect to D′.
Recall that q is the probability that a randomly picked vertex is compromised with respect to D.
If we treat K ′ as the binomial distribution with parameters (d′, q) given D′ = d′. Since
K =
D∑
i=1
Ai and K ′ =
D′∑
i=1
Ai,
where the Ai’s are independently and identically distributed Bernoulli random variable with
parameter q, it is straightforward to see that K st K ′. Since β + ηα + γx decreases as x grows, we
have
E
[
β + η
α+ γK
]
≥ E
[
β + η
α + γK ′
]
,
that is
h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) ≥ h(α, β, γ, η,D′; x).
This means that, for any x ∈ [0, 1], h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) decreases as D stochastically increases.
0 1
α
ηβ +
11 −−x
'qq
);,,,,( xDh ηγβα
);',,,,( xDh ηγβα
x
Fig. 10. Illustration of h(α, β, γ, η,D;x)
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Note that both 1x − 1 and h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) strictly decrease in interval (0, 1) as x grows.
Moreover, 1x − 1 − h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) > 0 as x → 0 and
1
x − 1 − h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) < 0 as
x → 1. Therefore, Eq. (II.1) must have exactly one real root in [0, 1]. Since q can be seen as
the point of intersection of the two curves 1x − 1 and h(α, β, γ, η,D; x), as illustrated in Figure
10, D st D′ implies q < q′. Therefore, q grows as D stochastically increases.
The following is the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof: (1) We notice that
Pr[Dg > d] =

 1, d < g,0, d ≥ g, and Pr[Dg′ > d] =

 1, d < g
′,
0, d ≥ g′.
Since g < g′, it is clear that Pr[Dg > d] ≤ Pr[Dg′ > d] for d = 0, 1, 2, . . . , |V | − 1. That is,
Dg st Dg′ .
(2) For the random graph with respect to degree distribution Dr, let B1, B2, . . . , B|V |−1 be the
respective indicators whether there is an edge between a randomly picked vertex and any other
vertex. Definition of random graphs implies
Pr[Bi = 1] = r = 1− Pr[Bi = 0] for i = 1, . . . , |V | − 1.
In parallel, for the random graph with respect to degree distribution Dr′ we have
Pr[B′i = 1] = r
′ = 1− Pr[B′i = 0] for i = 1, . . . , |V | − 1.
Then
Dr =
|V |−1∑
i=1
Bi and Dr′ =
|V |−1∑
i=1
B′i.
Since r ≤ r′, Bi st B′i for i = 1, 2, . . . , |V | − 1, it holds that
|V |−1∑
i=1
Bi st
|V |−1∑
i=1
B′i.
That is, Dr st Dr′ .
(3) Since
Pr[Dℓ,ν > d] =

 1, d < ℓ,ℓν
dν
, d ≥ ℓ,
and Pr[Dℓ,ν′ > d] =


1, d < ℓ,
ℓν
′
dν
′ , d ≥ ℓ,
ν ′ > ν implies
ℓν
dν
′
≤
ℓν
dν
,
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and hence Pr[Dℓ,ν > d] ≥ Pr[Dℓ,ν′ > d]. That is, Dℓ,ν′ st Dℓ,ν.
The following is the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof: For (1), we notice that
Pr[Dg > d] =

 1, d < g,0, d ≥ g, and Pr[Dℓ,ν > d] =

 1, d < ℓ,ℓν
dν
, d ≥ ℓ.
Hence ℓ ≥ g implies
Pr[Dℓ,ν > d] ≥ Pr[Dg > d], for all d ≥ 0,
and thus Dg st Dℓ,ν.
For (2), we notice that
Pr[Dℓ,ν = d] =
νℓν
dν+1
, for d = ℓ, · · · , |V | − 1.
By Laplace’s theorem, for any d = 0, 1, · · · , |V | − 1,
Pr[Dr = d] =
(
|V | − 1
d
)
rd(1− r)|V |−d−1
≈
1√
2π · (|V | − 1) · r(1− r)
exp
{
−
(d− r · (|V | − 1))2
2 · (|V | − 1) · r(1− r)
}
.
If r ≤ ℓ
|V | − 1
then
E[Dr] = (|V | − 1)r ≤ ℓ, (.1)
and 1− r ≥ |V | − ℓ− 1
|V | − 1
. If ℓ
2
2π(|V | − ℓ− 1)ν2
≤ r, then,
r(1− r) ≥ (1− r)
ℓ2
2π(|V | − ℓ− 1)ν2
≥
ℓ2
2π · (|V | − 1) · ν2
,
which is equivalent to
1√
2π · (|V | − 1) · r(1− r)
≤
ν
ℓ
.
Thus, we have, for all d = 0, 1, · · · , |V | − 1,
1√
2π · (|V | − 1) · r(1− r)
exp
{
−
(d− (|V | − 1) · r)2
2 · (|V | − 1) · r(1− r)
}
≤
ν
ℓ
. (.2)
In combination with (.1) and (.2), it holds that, for any d = ℓ, ℓ+ 1, · · · , |V | − 1,
Pr[Dr = d] ≤ Pr[Dℓ,ν = ℓ].
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Therefore, it holds that for all d = 0, 1, 2, · · · , |V | − 1,
Pr[Dr > d] ≤ Pr[Dℓ,ν > d],
and thus Dr st Dℓ,ν.
The following is the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof: On one hand, Eq. (II.1) shows that for given D and x, h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) increases
as β + η grows, and decreases as α or γ grows. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 10, we
observe (1) both 1x − 1 and h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) decrease with respect to x ∈ (0, 1), and (2) q is
the crossing point of the two curves 1x−1 and h(α, β, γ, η,D; x). Therefore, it can be concluded
that q decreases as β + η grows, and q increases as α or γ grows.
The following is the proof of Proposition 4.2.
Proof: For given D, denote by q1 the point of intersection of the curves x−1−1 and h(α, β+
ω, γ, η,D; x), by q2 the point of intersection of the curves x−1 − 1 and h(α− ω, β, γ, η,D; x),
and by q3 the point of intersection of the curves x−1 − 1 and h(α− ω, β, γ − ω, η,D; x).
(1) For our purpose, it suffices to verify whether q − q1 ≥ q − q2 or q − q2 > q − q1. Since
min{h(α, β + ω, γ, η,D; x), h(α− ω, β, γ, η,D; x)} > h(α, β, γ, η,D; x),
it is equivalent to check which strategy leads to a larger cross point with curve x−1 − 1. Let
f(D, q) = h(α, β + ω, γ, η,D; x)− h(α− ω, β, γ, η,D; x)
= E
[
β + η + ω
α+ γK
]
− E
[
β + η
α− ω + γK
]
= E
[
ω(α+ γK)− ω(β + η)− ω2
(α + γK)(α− ω + γK)
]
= ω · E
[
α + γK − β − η − ω
(α + γK)(α− ω + γK)
]
≥ ω · E
[
α + γK − β − η − ω
(α + γ · |V |)(α− ω + γ · |V |)
]
.
If α ≥ β + η and ω ∈ (0, α− β − η], then f(D, q) > 0, or q1 < q2. This means that increasing
β leads to a more secure system than decreasing α for ω ∈ (0, α− β − η]. That is, Strategy 1
is better than Strategy 2.
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(2) Suppose α + γµ < β + η and ω ∈ (0, β + η − α− γµ]. Then,
f(D, q) = ω · E
[
α + γK − β − η − ω
(α + γK)(α− ω + γK)
]
≤
ω
α(α− ω)
E [α + γK − β − η − ω]
≤
ω(α+ γµ− β − η − ω)
α(α− ω)
≤ 0.
This means that q1 ≥ q2, and thus Strategy 2 is better than Strategy 1.
(3) Notice that
E[K] =
|V |−1∑
d=1
E[K|D = d] · Pr[D = d] =
|V |−1∑
d=1
qd · Pr[D = d] = qE[D] = qµ.
Since
h(α, β, γ, η,D; x) = E
[
β + η
α+ γK
]
≤
β + η
α
,
the root of Eq. (II.1) is always greater than or equal to the root of 1
x
− 1 = β+η
α
. That is,
q ≤ α
α+β+η
.
For 0 < ω < min{α, γ}, if αµ
α+β+η
≥ 1, then E[K] ≥ 1. As a result,
h(α, β, γ − ω, η,D; x)− h(α− ω, β, γ, η,D; x)
= E
[
β + η
α + (γ − ω)K
]
− E
[
β + η
α + γK − ω
]
= (β + η) · E
[
ω(K − 1)
[α + (γ − ω)K][α + γK − ω]
]
≥
(β + η)ω(E[K]− 1)
[α + (γ − ω)(|V | − 1)][α+ γ(|V | − 1)− ω]
≥ 0.
Hence, q3 < q2, and Strategy 3 is better than Strategy 2.
The following is the proof of Proposition 5.1.
Proof: For a regular graph G with degree D ≡ d,
β + η
α + γd
≤ E
[
β + η
α + γK
]
≤
β + η
α
.
By Eq. (II.2), it holds that
1
1 +
β + η
α
≤ q =
1
1 + E
[
β + η
α + γK
] ≤ 1
1 +
β + η
α + γd
,
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and hence the proposition holds.
The following is the proof of Proposition 5.2.
Proof: (Upper bound) By Jessen’s inequality,
E
[
1
α+ γK
]
≥
1
α + γqµ
≥
1
α + γµ
.
Then,
q =
1
1 + E
[
β + η
α + γK
] ≤ q˜ def= 1
1 +
β + η
α + γµ
=
α + γµ
α+ β + η + γµ
.
(Lower bound) Consider a random variable K0 such that
Pr[K0 = 0] = Pr[K = 0] =
N−1∑
d=0
(1− q)d Pr[D = d] = E[(1− q)D],
and
Pr[K0 = 1] = 1− E[(1− q)
D].
It is obvious that K0 st K. Note that
1
α + γK
st
1
α + γK0
,
we have
E
[
1
α + γK
]
≤ E
[
1
α + γK0
]
.
Since
E
[
1
α + γK0
]
=
1
α
E[(1− q)D] +
1
α + γ
(
1− E[(1− q)D]
)
=
1
α + γ
+
(
1
α
−
1
α + γ
)
E[(1− q)D]
≤
1
α + γ
+
γ
α(α + γ)
=
1
α
,
it follows that
q =
1
1 + E
[
β + η
α + γK
] ≥ 1
1 + E
[
β + η
α + γK0
] ≥ qˆ def= 1
1 +
β + η
α
=
α
α + β + γ
.
The following is the proof of Proposition 5.4.
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Proof: Since the size of the graph (V,E) is usually large, by using Laplace’s theorem, we
have
Pr[C˜t ≤ c |V |] ≈ Φ
(
c |V | − q˜ |V |√
q˜(1− q˜) |V |
)
,
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal random variable.
For any small ε ∈ (0, 1), let z(ε) be the 1 − ε quantile of the standard normal distribution.
Set Φ
(
c |V | − q˜ |V |√
q˜(1− q˜) |V |
)
≥ 1− ε, we have c |V | − q˜ |V |√
q˜(1− q˜) |V |
≥ z(ε). Denote by
f1(q˜) = q˜
2
(
|V |+ z2(ε)
)
− q˜
(
2c|V |+ z2(ε)
)
+ c2|V | ≥ 0. (.3)
Since f1(c) < 0, f1(0) > 0, and f1(1) > 0, f1(q˜) = 0 has two real solutions in the unit interval
(0, 1) and c lies between these two solutions. Notice that q˜ = 1 must be excluded (otherwise,
Eq. (.3) does not hold). This implies that we only need to consider the smaller root of f1(q˜) = 0,
which is
λ(ε, c, V ) =
2c|V |+ z2(ε)−
√
z4(ε) + 4c|V |(1− c)z2(ε)
2
[
|V |+ z2(ε)
]
≥
2c|V |+ z2(ε)−
[
z2(ε) + 2c|V |(1− c)
]
2
[
|V |+ z2(ε)
]
=
c2|V |
|V |+ z2(ε)
,
by taking Eq. (V.3) into consideration, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), if
α + γµ
α+ β + η + γµ
≤
c2|V |
|V |+ z2(ε)
,
then Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ Pr[C˜t ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1− ε.
The following is the proof of Proposition 5.5.
Proof: By using Laplace’s theorem,
Pr[Cˆt ≤ c |V |] ≈ Φ
(
c |V | − qˆ |V |√
qˆ(1− qˆ) |V |
)
.
For any small ε ∈ (0, 1), Φ
(
c |V | − qˆ |V |√
qˆ(1− q˜) |V |
)
≥ 1− ε is equivalent to
f2(qˆ) = qˆ
2
(
|V |+ z2(ε)
)
− qˆ
(
2c|V |+ z2(ε)
)
+ c2|V | ≥ 0.
Then, for large t, Pr[Cˆt ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1 − ε implies qˆ ≤
c2|V |
|V |+ z2(ε)
. In combination with Eq.
(V.3), we have, if Pr[Ct ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1− ε then Pr[Cˆt ≤ c |V |] ≥ 1− ε and hence Eq. (V.5).
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